

William of Ockham, Ordinatio, I, dist. 2, q. 6.

Translated by John Kilcullen from Guillelmi de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, vol. 2, ed. S. Brown and G. Gál (St Bonaventure, 1970). References come from that edition. Material in ((double)) brackets is marked in that edition as an addition made by Ockham in revising his work. Material in [square brackets] is not in the Latin text.

[QUESTION 6: WHETHER THE UNIVERSAL IS REALLY OUTSIDE THE SOUL, NOT REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL?]

Third I ask whether the universal is really outside the soul, not really distinct from the individual?

[1] It seems that there is: For the nature of a man is this, and yet is not this {de se} of itself, because then it could not be in another; therefore through something added to it. And not through something distinct [from it] really, because by the same argument the nature of whiteness would be this through something added [that is] really distinct, and then this whiteness would be really composite, which seems false. Therefore the nature is this through something added that is really distinct.

[2] To the opposite: No nature that is really individual is really universal; therefore if that nature is really the individual, it will not be really universal.

[THE OPINION OF DUNS SCOTUS]

[3] To this question it is said that in the thing outside the soul the nature is really the same as the difference contracting [it] to the determinate individual, but distinct formally, which is of itself {de se} neither universal nor particular; rather, it is incompletely universal in the thing and completely [universal] according to being in the intellect. And because this opinion is, I believe, the opinion of the subtle doctor, who excelled others in subtlety of judgment, I therefore wish to report distinctly here the whole of that opinion which he put forward in various scattered places, not changing the words he used in various places.

[4] It is this Doctor's {intentio} meaning that, besides numerical unity there is a real unity that is less than numerical unity, which befits the nature itself that is in some way universal. And the contractible nature can therefore be compared, first, to the singular itself; second, it can be compared to numerical unity; third, it can be compared to being universal; fourth, it can be compared with the unity less than numerical unity.

[5] If it is compared to the singular itself, thus this opinion asserts that the nature is this not of itself but through something added. And second it asserts that that addition is not negation (in question 2) [Scotus, Ordinatio, II, d. 3, q. 2]; nor something accidental (in question 3); nor actual existence (in question 4); nor matter (in question 5). Third, that what is added is in the genus of substance, and intrinsic to the individual. Fourth, that the nature is naturally prior to the contracting [addition]. Thus he says: 'Every[. . .]

entity (whether total or partial) of any kind is of itself indifferent[. . .] to this entity or that, so that, as quidditative entity, it is naturally prior to that entity as it is this; and as it is naturally prior, just as it does not befit it from itself to be this, so its opposite is not repugnant with it from its ratio. And just as the composite does not[. . .] include the entity by which it is this composite, so neither does the matter, as it is matter include the entity by which it is this matter; and in the same way of the form. Therefore this entity is not matter or form or composite, as any of these is the nature, but it is the ultimate reality of the being that is the matter, and of the being that is the form, and of the being that is the composite; so that everything common and yet determinable can be further distinguished (however much it is one thing) into several realities formally distinct, of which this is formally not that: and this is formally the singular entity, and that is formally the entity of the common nature. And these entities cannot be thing and thing (*res et res*), as the realities (*realitates*) from which the genus is taken and the reality whence the difference is taken (from which the specific reality is sometimes taken) can be -- but in the same thing (whether part or whole), they are always formally distinct realities of the same thing' [Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, d. 3, q. 6 (paras. 187--8, pp. 483--4, in John Duns Scotus, *Opera Omnia*, ed. C. Balic and others, Rome, 1950--)]

[6] From this it is clear that, concerning the contracting difference, he asserts this position: that the individual difference is not quidditative. Second, that the nature is prior naturally to the contracting difference. Third, that the nature is not of itself repugnant with the opposite of the individual difference, namely another individual difference, just as, also, that individual difference does not befit it [the nature] from itself. Fourth, that this is universally true both in the whole and in its parts, and similarly that the individual difference and the nature are not distinguished as thing and thing. Fifth, that they are distinguished only formally. Sixth, he asserts elsewhere that the nature is really other and other [i.e. many] with another and another [i.e. many] contracting differences. Thus he says: 'Every substance existing per se is proper to that of which it is, i.e. either it is proper from itself, or it is made proper through something contracting it; when this contracting [factor] is posited, it cannot be in another, though it is not from itself repugnant with it to be in another' [I, d. 3, q. 1, para. 41, p. 409]. Thus he says, for this reason, that the Idea attributed to Plato is not the substance of Socrates. Thus, in the same place, he continues: 'The Idea will not be the substance of Socrates, because not the nature of Socrates, because not of itself proper nor appropriated to Socrates as it is in him only, but it is also in another, according to him', i.e. in Plato. He asserts similar opinions elsewhere in various places.

[7] But if the nature is compared to numerical unity, he asserts similarly that the nature does not have numerical unity from itself, neither is it that which is denominated immediately by any real unity whatever. It is, however, really one in number. Neither is it really something one by any real unity whatever in two individuals, but in one only. Thus he says: 'I concede that real unity is not of something existing in two individuals, but in one. And when you object that "Whatever is in the same in number is the same in number", I answer first in [relation to] something [else], similar and more manifest. Whatever is in one species is one in species; therefore "the colour in whiteness is one in species, therefore it does not have a unity less than the unity of species" does not follow. For just as it was said elsewhere that something can be called "animated" denominatively, such as a body, or per se in the first mode, such as a man (and thus a surface is called white denominatively, and a white surface is called white per se in the first way, because the subject includes the predicate): so I say that the potential

that is contracted through the actual is informed by that actual, and through this is informed by the unity consequent upon that actuality or that act; and thus it is one by the proper unity of that actual; but it is thus one denominatively, and is not thus one of itself, and not primo nor through an essential part. Therefore colour in whiteness is one in species, but not of itself, nor through itself, nor primo, but only denominatively; but the specific difference is one primo, because it is primo repugnant with it to be divided into several in species. But whiteness is one in species per se, but not primo, because through something intrinsic to itself (i.e. through that difference). Thus I concede that whatever is in this stone is one in number, either primo or per se or denominatively: primo such as, perhaps, that through which such unity befits this composite; per se, as this stone, of which that which is primo one by this unity is a part; denominatively only, as the potential that is perfected by that actual, which quasi-denominatively relates to in actuality and unity' [II, d. 3, q. 5--6, para. 172--175, pp.476--8].

[8] If, however, in the third way, the nature is compared to being universal, thus he asserts that of itself it is not completely universal, but [it is universal] as it has being in the intellect. Second, that of itself commonness, not singularity, befits it. Thus he says: 'The universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity according to which it is in proximate potency to be predicated of whatever supposit, because, according to the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics I [73 b26--7], "the universal is what is one in many and [is predicated] of many". But nothing according to any unity whatever in the thing is such that, according to that unity precisely, it is in proximate potency to whatever supposit in a predication saying "this is this"; because although it is not repugnant from itself to anything existing in reality {in re} to be in a singularity other than that in which it is, yet it cannot truly be said of whatever inferior, namely that each is it. For this is possible only of numerically the same object actually considered by the intellect; that, indeed, has, as understood [in the mind], the unity, even numerical, of an object, according to which that identical [concept] is predicable of every singular, saying "this is this" [II, d. 3, q. 1, para. 37, pp. 406--7]. And he adds: 'There is in reality something common that is not of itself this, and consequently of itself it is not repugnant with it to be not-this. But such a common [nature] is not a universal in act, because it lacks the indifference according to which the universal is completely universal, i.e. according to which something that is the same by some identity is predicable of any individual so that each is it' [para. 38, pp. 407--8].

[9] Also, in the same place he adds: 'Commonness and singularity are not related to the nature as being in the intellect and true being outside the soul, because commonness befits the nature outside the intellect, and similarly singularity. And commonness befits the nature from itself; but singularity befits the nature through something in the thing that contracts it. But universality does not befit the thing from itself. And therefore I concede that we must seek a cause of universality, but we need not seek a cause of commonness other than the nature itself. And once we posit commonness in the nature itself according to its own entity and unity, we must necessarily seek a cause of singularity, that super-adds something to the nature of what it is' [para. 42, p. 410].

[10] If, fourth, the nature is compared to the unity less than numerical unity, thus he asserts that that unity is not under the quidditative ratio of the nature but is predicated of it in the second mode of predicating per se. Thus he says: 'In this way I understand that the nature has a real unity less than numerical unity, though it does not have it of

itself so that it is within the ratio of the nature; because horseness is just horseness, according to Avicenna, *Metaphysics V*; yet that unity is a proper passion of the nature according to its first entity' [para. 34, p. 404].

[ARGUMENTS FOR SCOTUS'S PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION]

[11] In favour of the principal conclusion of this opinion there are many arguments First as follows. 'Whatever is in something from its ratio per se is in it in whatever [instance]; therefore, if the nature of man were of itself this, whatever [instance] the nature of man was in would be this man' [para. 3, p. 392].

[12] Second, because 'with whatever one opposite befits, the other opposite is of itself repugnant; therefore if the nature is of itself one in number, numerical multitude is repugnant with it from itself' [para. 4, p. 393].

[13] Third, as follows. 'An object qua object is naturally prior to the act [of understanding], and in that prior [instant] is of itself singular, because this always befits a nature not taken secundum quid [that is, in relation to something] or according to the being it has in the soul; therefore someone understanding that object under the ratio of universal understands it under a ratio opposite to its own ratio', namely in as much as it is universal, 'because as it precedes the act it is determined to the opposite of that ratio', namely of universal [para. 7, p. 394].

[14] Fourth, as follows, 'Everything of which the proper and sufficient real unity is less than numerical unity is not of itself one with numerical unity, or is not of itself this; but the proper real or sufficient unity of the nature existing in that stone is a unity less than numerical; therefore etc. The major is clear of itself, because nothing is of itself one with a unity greater than the unity sufficient to it. For if the proper unity due to something of itself is less than numerical unity, then numerical unity does not befit it from its nature and according to itself. Otherwise precisely from its nature it would have greater and lesser unity, which (about the same and according to the same) are opposites: because the multitude opposed to the greater unity can stand with the lesser unity without contradiction, but this multitudes cannot stand with the greater unity because it is repugnant with it; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: because if there is no real unity of a nature that is less than singularity, and all unity other than the unity of singularity and of the specific nature is less than real unity [Scotus's text reads: 'is a unity of reason only'], therefore there will be no real unity less than numerical unity. The consequent is false, as I will prove in five or six ways; therefore etc.' [paras. 9 and 10, p. 395].

[15] 'The first way is this. According to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics X* [1052 a15--1054 a19], "In every genus there is one first that is the metre and measure of all the things that are of that genus". The unity of the first measurer is real, because the Philosopher proves that the first ratio of measuring befits one. And he explains in order how in every genus that which the ratio of measuring befits is one. Also, that unity belongs to something in so far as it is first in the genus, because the measured are real things and are really measured: but a real being cannot be really measured by a being of reason; therefore. That real unity is not unity of singularity, because there is nothing singular in the genus that is the measure of all the things that are in the genus. For according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics III* [999 a12--13], in individuals of the same

species there is not this prior and that posterior. Though the commentator expounds this "prior" otherwise of the prior that constitutes the posterior, yet [this is] nothing [relevant] to b, because the Philosopher's intention there is to agree with Plato, that in individuals of the same species there is not an essential order etc. Therefore no individual is per se the measure of those which are in its species; therefore neither is numerical or individual unity' [II, d. 3, q. 1, paras. 11--15, pp. 396--7].

[16] 'Moreover, second I prove that the same consequent is false, because according to the Philosopher, Physics VII [249 a2--5], in an undivided {atoma} species comparison takes place, because there is one nature, but not in a genus, because a genus does not have such unity. The difference is not of unity according to reason, because the concept of a genus is just as much one in number in the intellect as is the concept of a species, otherwise no concept would be said quidditatively {in quid} of many species, and so no concept would a genus, but there would be as many concepts said of species as there are concepts of species, and then in every predication the same thing would be predicated of itself. Similarly the unity of concept or non-concept is nothing to the Philosopher's intention there, namely [in reference] to comparison or not. Therefore he means there that the specific nature is one by the unity of the specific nature; but he does not mean that it is thus one by numerical unity, because in that comparison does not take place; therefore etc.' [II, d. 3, q. 1, paras. 16--17, pp. 397--8].

[17] 'Moreover third: According to the Philosopher, Metaphysics V, chapter about relation [1021 a9--11], the same, the like and the equal are based upon the one. But a relation is not real unless it has a real foundation and a real ratio of founding; therefore the unity required in the foundation of a relation of likeness is real and not numerical, because nothing one and the same is similar or equal to itself' [II, d. 3, q. 1, para. 18, p. 398].

[18] 'Moreover, fourth: of one real opposition there are two real first extremes; but contrariety is a real opposition. This is clear, because one really corrupts the other, apart from {circumscripto} every work of intellect, and only because they are contraries; therefore each first extreme of this opposition is real. But as it is an extreme, it is one with some real unity, and not numerical, because then precisely this white, or precisely that white, would be the first contrary of the black, which is unsuitable; for then there would be as many first contrarieties as there are individuals' [para.19, pp.398--9].

[19] 'Moreover, fifth: The object of one act of sensation is one according to a real unity, but not numerical; therefore there is some other real unity. Proof of the major: because the power knowing the object thus, namely in as much as it is one by this unity, knows it in as much as it is distinct from anything whatever that is not one by that unity. But the sense does not know the object in as much as it is distinct from anything whatever that is not one by that numerical unity, because no sense distinguishes this ray of the sun as differing numerically from another ray, whereas they are nevertheless diverse because of the sun's movement. But [Scotus's text reads: 'if'] all common sensibles are set aside, such as diversity of place or site, and if two quantities are asserted to exist at the same time through divine power which would altogether alike and equal in whiteness, the sight would not distinguish that there are two whites there. But if it knew either of them in as much as it is one by numerical unity, it would know it in as much as it is one distinct by numerical unity. In accordance with this, therefore, it could be

argued concerning the first object of sense (at least concerning the object of one act of sensing) that it is one in itself by some real unity, because just as the object of this power is as much as the object precedes the [act of] understanding, so also according to its real unity it precedes every act of the intellect' [paras. 20--21, pp. 399--400].

[20] 'Moreover, sixth, because if every real unity is numerical, therefore every real diversity is numerical. The consequent is false, because every numerical diversity in as much as it is numerical is equal, and thus all would be equally distinct, and then the intellect could not more abstract something common from Socrates and Plato than from Socrates and a line, and every universal would be a pure figment of the intellect. The first consequence is proved in two ways: first, because one and many, same and diverse, are opposites, from *Metaphysics* X, ch.5 [1054 a20--1055 a2]; but as often [that is, in as many different senses] as one of the opposites is said, so often the rest are said also, from *Topics* I [106 b13--21]. Therefore to every unity will correspond its own diversity. It is proved second because each extreme of any diversity is in itself one, and in the way it is one in itself it seems to be diverse from the other extreme, so that the unity of one extreme seems to be per se the ratio of the diversity of the other extreme. This is confirmed also in another way, because if the only real unity in this thing is numerical, whatever unity there is in that thing is from itself one in number; therefore this and that, according to every entity in them, are primo diverse, because they agree in no one [entity] in any way. It is confirmed also through this, that numerical diversity is for and this singular not to be that singular, supposing, however, the entity of both extremes. But such unity is necessarily of the other extreme' [II, d. 3, q. 1, paras. 23--27, pp. 400--1].

[21] 'Moreover [seventh], [even] if no intellect existed, fire would generate fire and corrupt water; and there would be some real unity of generator to generated according to the form, on account of which it would be univocal generation; but the intellect contemplating it does not make generation to be univocal' [para. 28, pp. 401--2].

[22] Moreover, 'Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* V says that horseness is only horseness, and that it is of itself neither one nor many, neither universal nor particular'; therefore etc. [para.31, pp.402--403].

[23] 'Moreover, it is impossible for the one [thing], by altogether the same [thing] on the part of the thing, to differ really from something and really agree with it; but Socrates really differs from Plato, and really agrees with him; therefore, etc.' [I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1--4, pp. 354 ff].

[CRITICISMS OF SCOTUS'S OPINION]

[24] Against this opinion it is possible to argue in two ways. First because it is impossible in creatures for certain [things] to differ formally unless they are distinguished really; therefore, if the nature is in any way distinguished from the contracting difference, they must be distinguished as thing and thing {res et res}, or as being of reason and being of reason, or as real being and being of reason. But the first is denied by him [II, d. 3, q. 6, para. 188, p. 484], and likewise the second, therefore the third must be granted: therefore a nature that is in any way distinguished from the individual is nothing but a being of reason. The antecedent is clear, because if the nature and the contracting difference are not in every way the same, therefore

something can truly be affirmed of one and denied of the other; but in creatures it is not possible for the same to be truly affirmed and truly denied of the same thing; therefore they are not one thing. The minor is clear, because if it was so, every way of proving a distinction of things in creatures would perish, because contradiction is the strongest way to prove a distinction of things. Therefore if in creatures it is quite possible for the same to be truly denied and truly affirmed of the same thing ((or of the same for the same thing)), no real distinction can be proved in them. This is confirmed, because all contradictories have an equal repugnance; but the repugnance between being and not-being is so great that if a is and b is not, it follows that b is not a; therefore thus of all contradictories whatever.

[25] If it is said: it is true of first contradictions that through them it is possible to prove real non-identity, but this is not possible through other contradictions:

[26] Against: Syllogistic form holds equally in all [subject] matter, therefore this is a good syllogism: Every a is b, c is not b, therefore c is not a: and consequently, concerning a and not-a, it is true that if this is a and this is not a, then this is not this [i.e. this is not that], in the same way as, if this is and this is not, this is not this. Therefore similarly in the present case: if every individual difference is of itself proper to some individual and the nature is not of itself proper to some individual, it follows that the nature is not the individual difference, and this really.

[27] If it be said that this argument is unsound, because the divine Essence is the Son, and the Father is not the Son, and yet the Father is the Essence:

[28] This answer does not suffice, because just as it is singular in God [i.e. is true only of God] that three things {res} are one thing in number, and therefore that thing one in number is each of those three things, and yet one of the three things is not the other, so it is singular and exceeds all understanding that [the consequence] does not follow: 'The Essence, one in number, is the Son, the Father is not the Son, therefore the Father is not the Essence.' And therefore that singularity should not be asserted except where a text {auctoritas} of Sacred Scripture compels it. And therefore such a consequence should never be denied in creatures, because there no text of Sacred Scripture compels it, since in creatures no one thing is several things and each of them.

[29] If it is said that such a consequence is good if both premisses are taken without any determination, and therefore it does indeed follow: 'Every individual difference is proper to some individual, the nature is not proper, therefore the nature is not the individual difference really' -- but then the minor is false. But it does not hold universally if it is taken precisely under some certain syncategorematic determination, such as 'of itself' or {per se} 'through itself':

[30] This has no force, because as the uniform syllogistic form, both in propositions of inherence and in modal propositions, and similarly the syllogistic form mixed of those -- so the syllogistic form both uniform and mixed in other propositions taken with other syncategorematic determinations, such as {per se} 'through itself', 'in as much as', and the like. And consequently this syllogistic form: 'Every man per se is animal, no stone per se is animal, therefore no stone per se is a man, and, consequently, universally no stone is a man', is just as [valid as] this is: 'Every animal, of necessity, is a substance;

no accident, of necessity, is a substance; therefore no accident, of necessity, is animal'. Similarly this is a good mixed syllogism: 'Every man per se is animal, nothing white is animal, therefore nothing white is man'; therefore in the same way this will be a good syllogism: 'Every individual difference is of itself proper to some individual, the nature is not of itself proper, therefore the nature is not the individual difference'. And similarly this will be a good syllogism: 'No individual difference is common really, the nature is common really, therefore the nature is not the individual difference really'. And the premisses are true, therefore also the conclusion.

[31] This is confirmed, because just as from propositions concerning the necessary always follows a conclusion of inherence, so from propositions with a [i.e. sign] of perseity there follows a conclusion of inherence, and this because per se is 'necessary'. Therefore, just as it follows formally and syllogistically, 'The nature is necessarily communicable [shareable], the contracting difference is necessarily not communicable, therefore the contracting difference is not the nature', so it follows: 'The nature per se is communicable to many, the contracting difference of itself is not communicable to many, therefore the contracting difference is not the nature'. And it has no force to say that the conclusion is true, e.g. that the contracting difference is not the nature, although it is not distinguished really from it, because it follows: 'They are not distinguished really, and each is a thing {res}, therefore they are really the same, therefore the one really is the other', and further, 'therefore one is the other', and consequently 'the predication of one of the other is true'. The penultimate consequence is clear, because 'really' is not a destroying or diminishing determination, just as 'formally' is not; and, consequently, [the inference] from something taken with such a determination to the same taken per se is a formal consequence [i.e. one valid no matter what the terms], according to the Philosopher's rule in *On Interpretation*, II [22 a14--23 a27].

[32] ((The whole of the preceding argument is confirmed. For just as the 'to be said of no' is the rule of the syllogism, 'No difference is common, the nature is common, therefore the nature is not the difference', so the 'to be said of no' is the rule of this: 'No difference is of itself common, the nature is of itself common, therefore the nature is not the difference'.)) [*Go to paragraph 53]

[33] In a second way it can be argued against the above opinion that it is not true even positing that there was such a distinction. First thus: Whenever one of opposites befits something really, so that it is truly and really denominated by it (whether it befits it from itself or through another), while this stands and is not changed, the other opposite really does not befit it, indeed is simply negated of it. But, according to you, every thing outside the soul is really singular and one in number, although some [thing] is singular of itself and the other only through something added; therefore no thing outside the soul is really common nor one with a unity opposed to the unity of singularity; therefore really there is no other unity except the unity of singularity.

[34] If it be said that these two unities are not really opposite, and in the same way singularity and community are not really opposed:

[35] Against: if they are not opposed really, therefore by no [other] opposition can it be inferred that they cannot, {a parte rei} on the part of the thing, befit the same [thing] primo, therefore it cannot be sufficiently inferred that the same and through the same

is not one in every way, by this unity and that, and that the same and through the same is not in every way singular and common.

[36] Moreover, whenever the consequents are repugnant the antecedents were also repugnant. But it follows: 'a is common, or one with the lesser unity, therefore with a stands the multitude opposed to the greater unity, namely numerical multitude'; and it follows: 'a is one with the greater unity, therefore with a does not stand the opposite multitude, namely numerical multitude'. But these [the consequents] are repugnant: 'with a stands numerical multitude', 'with a does not stand numerical multitude'. Therefore these [the antecedents] are repugnant: 'a is one with the lesser unity', 'a is one with the greater unity'. But, according to you, this is true: 'a is one by the greater unity', because you say that the nature is one in number. Therefore this is false: 'a is one by the lesser unity', always taking a for the nature itself, which you say is always one with the lesser unity; and if the nature is not one with the lesser unity, much more strongly neither is anything else. The minor premise {assumptum} is clear through his statement: 'The multitude opposed to the greater unity can stand without contradiction with the lesser unity; this multitude cannot stand with the greater unity, because it is repugnant with it' [II, d. 3 q. 1, para. 9, p. 395].

[37] If it is said that that form of arguing is unsound, because blackness stands with man, and blackness does not stand with something white, and yet man is white, and a is a man and is white:

[38] This is not sound, because -- taking 'stand' uniformly -- one or other of those is false. For taking 'stand' actually, then this is false, that blackness stands with Socrates (if Socrates is white). But taking it potentially, then this is false: 'blackness does not stand with something white', because blackness can stand with something white, because blackness can stand with the white, just as the white can be black or have blackness. Thus although blackness is repugnant with whiteness, yet it is not repugnant with that which is white, and consequently is not repugnant with the white, because the two terms 'the white' and 'that which is white' convert.

[39] Moreover, his statement that 'the multitude opposed to the greater unity can stand without contradiction with the lesser unity' seems repugnant with another of his statements, that nature and individual difference do not differ really; because when some two are the same really, whatever either can really be by divine power, the other can be. But the individual difference cannot be several in number really distinct; therefore the nature, which is really the same with that contracting difference, cannot be many really; neither, consequently, can any thing be except the contracting difference; and thus the nature is not compatible without contradiction with numerical multitude.

[40] This argument is confirmed. Because everything that is really universal, whether it is completely universal or not, is really common to many, ((or at least can be really common to many)); but no thing is really common to many; therefore no thing is universal in any way whatever. The major is manifest, because the universal is distinguished from the singular by this, that the singular is determined to one, but the universal is indifferent to many, in the way in which it is a universal. The minor is manifest, because no thing really singular is common to many; but every thing, according to them, is really singular; therefore etc. Similarly, if some thing implied

{importata} by man is common to many, either it is the nature that is in Socrates, or the nature that is in Plato, or some third [nature] apart from them. Not the nature of Socrates, because from the fact that it is really singular it cannot be in Plato; nor the nature of Plato, for the same reason; nor a third nature, because there is nothing such outside the soul, because according to them every thing outside the soul is really singular.

[41] It is confirmed, second, because that which cannot be communicated to many even by divine power is not really common; but, pointing to any thing whatever, that cannot by divine power be communicated to many, because it is really singular; therefore no thing is really and positively common.

[42] If it be said that although it is repugnant with that nature to be in many, nevertheless it is not repugnant with it of itself, but on account of something added, with which it is one through real identity:

[43] Against: this 'non-repugnance of itself' is not positive, and consequently this community is not positive so that there is something common, but only negative; and consequently there is not some positive unity except only numerical unity.

[44] Moreover, I can attribute such negative lesser unity to that individual grade [another term Scotus uses for the individuating entity], because certainly it is not one in number from itself and per se in the first way of saying per se. And thus, taking 'not to be repugnant from itself or per se' as it is opposed to belonging to some thing per se in the first way of saying per se, this will be true: 'To be in many is not repugnant from itself with that individual difference', or 'To be one by a unity less than numerical unity is not repugnant with it from itself'; because the opposite is false according to them, namely that this individual difference is one in number per se in the first way.

[45] Second principally in accordance with this way [the first began at para. 33], I argue thus: Because if the nature were in that way common, it would follow that there would be as many species and genera as there are individuals; because the nature of Socrates is a species, and by the same argument the nature of Plato [is a species]. Then I argue: whenever certain [things] are really many of which each can be called a species, then they are many species; but so it is in {proposito} the present case; therefore, etc.

[46] It is confirmed, because upon the multiplication of the proximate subject follows the multiplication of the passion; but according to him this lesser unity is a passion of the nature; therefore as the nature is really multiplied so the passion, since it is real, will be really multiplied. And consequently just as really there are two natures in Socrates and Plato, so there will be really two lesser unities; but that lesser unity is commonness, or is inseparable from commonness, and consequently inseparable from what is common; therefore there are two common [things] in Socrates and Plato, and consequently two species. And consequently Socrates would be under one common [classification] and Plato under another, and thus there would be as many common [classifications], even most general, as there are individuals, which seems absurd.

[47] If it be said that a thing is not completely universal, but only as it is considered by the intellect:

[48] Against: I ask of that which is immediately denominated universal: either it is precisely a true thing outside the soul, or it is precisely a being of reason, or it is an aggregate of real being and being of reason. If the first is given, the point is established {habetur propositum}, that the singular thing is simply the universal complete (against his own statement, because, according to them, outside the soul there is no thing that is not really singular), and consequently the same thing that is really singular is common; and not one more than another; therefore there are as many complete universals as there are singulars. If the second is given, it follows that no thing is universal, neither completely nor inchoately, neither in act nor in potency, because that which cannot be reduced by divine power to the completion {complementum} and the act as it is of some sort is not such either in potency or inchoately. And this is true where it is not the case that from the fact that it is reduced to one act there remains a potency to another act, as in the division of the continuous to infinity, and when something is in potency to contradictories; such as is not the case in {proposito} the present instance. Therefore if precisely a being of reason is completely universal, and in act, and in no way a thing outside the soul, it follows that a thing outside the soul is in no way universal, not more one than another. If the third is given, the point is established, because the multiplication of the whole or of the aggregate always follows upon the multiplication of any part whatever; therefore if the complete universal is an aggregate of thing and a being of reason, there will be as many aggregates as there are things outside the soul of which each is part of the whole aggregate; and so it will stand that there will be as many most general genera as there are individuals.

[49] Moreover, just as the universal is 'one in many and of many' and predicable of them, so the common is one in many and of many and predicable of them; but this is enough for something to be completely universal, according to them; therefore every common has whatever is needed for something to be completely universal, and consequently for something to be completely a species or genus. But according to them (as has been reported) commonness befits the nature from itself outside the intellect, therefore it is also completely universal. And, consequently, from the fact (as was proved) that there are as many commons as there are individuals, it follows that from the nature of the thing there are as many most general genera as there are individuals.

[50] It is confirmed, because if the nature that is in Socrates is truly common, therefore since when Socrates is destroyed everything essential to him is destroyed, it follows that something common is truly destroyed and annihilated; but it is certain that there remains something common, because there remains an individual. And from such a contradiction it is possible to infer a real distinction, according to them; therefore one of those commons is not really the other, and consequently when they exist they are many.

[51] If it be said that the nature is not common from the fact that it is appropriated to Socrates through the contracting difference:

[52] Against: According to you, that commonness befits the nature outside the soul; I ask, therefore, For what does the nature there supposit? Either for a real being or for a being of reason. The second cannot be given, because this would include a contradiction. If it supposits for a real being, either, therefore, for a real being that is singular, or for some real being that is not really singular. If the first, therefore it is not

common and consequently is not common from itself. If the second is given, therefore there is some thing outside the soul that is not really singular -- which, however, they deny, because they say that the nature is really one in number and singular.

[53] Third I argue thus. The humanity in Socrates and the humanity in Plato are distinguished really; therefore each of them is really one in number, and consequently neither is common.

[54] If it be said that those natures are not distinct except through those added differences, just as neither of them is one in number except through an added difference, and therefore neither is of itself singular, but is of itself common:

[55] Against: Every thing is essentially distinguished from any other thing from which it is essentially distinguished by itself, or through something intrinsic to itself; but the humanity that is in Socrates is essentially distinguished from the humanity that is in Plato; therefore it is distinguished from it by itself or through something intrinsic to it, and therefore not through something extrinsic added to it. The major is clear, because {nihil est dictu} it is pointless to say that Socrates is distinguished from that ass by Plato essentially. Similarly, to be the same and diverse follow upon being immediately, therefore nothing is the same or diverse from something through something extrinsic. Similarly, according to the Philosopher and the Commentator, Metaphysics IV [1003 624], every being is one through its essence and not through something added, therefore nothing is one in number through something added; therefore the nature that is in Socrates, if it is one in number, will be one in number be itself or by something essential to it. Similarly, if the nature is one in number, therefore it is not common, and consequently is not common of itself, because the determination 'of itself' is not a destroying or diminishing determination; therefore [an inference] from the negation of the determinable absolutely to the negation of the determinable with this determination is a good consequence. Therefore, just as it follows, 'Socrates is not a man, therefore he is not necessarily a man', so it follows 'The humanity that is in Socrates is not common, therefore it is not of itself common'. [*Go to paragraph 85]

[56] This is confirmed, because whenever something is said to befit something of itself not positively but negatively, as it is said that a creature is of itself not a being and that matter is of itself {privata} deprived [i.e., does not have any quality, quantity, etc.] (these and the like are false {de virtute sermonis} literally but are true according as they are equipollent with certain negatives, e.g. 'matter is not of itself formed', 'a creature is not of itself such a being'), although it need not actually be in what it is said to befit from itself, nevertheless it can simply (at least by divine power) be in it, as a creature can be not a being, and matter can be deprived or can have been deprived. Therefore, similarly, the humanity that is in Socrates can be common to many men. The consequent is impossible, therefore also the antecedent. Proof of the falsity of the consequent: because when certain things are the same really, it is impossible that one is really the same with another without the other being really the same as it. (And this is true in creatures; and also in some way it is true in God, because although it is not true to say that the Father is the Son notwithstanding the identity of both Father and Son with the Divine Essence, nevertheless it is true to say the Father is that thing that is the Son.) Therefore, since the humanity that is in Socrates is the same really with the contracting difference, if the humanity that is in Socrates can be the same really with the contracting difference in Plato, it follows that this contracting difference and that

contracting difference could be one thing, and consequently some one thing could be Socrates and Plato, which includes a contradiction.

[57] Moreover, whatever is distinguished {a parte rei} on the part of the thing from another that is not of its formal {intellectum} concept can be intuitively seen without it, according to that Doctor, who also asserts that the Divine Essence can be intuitively seen without a Person. Therefore the humanity that is in Socrates can be seen intuitively without the contracting difference, and in the same way the humanity that is in Plato can be seen intuitively without any contracting difference, and consequently, since those humanities are distinguished in place and subject, such an intellect can distinguish one from the other without any contracting difference; this would not be possible if they were distinguished precisely through their contracting differences; therefore they are numerically distinguished by themselves.

[58] This is confirmed, because such an intellect can form such a negative proposition, saying 'this is not this'; and it can know that it is true; therefore that thing is by itself not the other thing.

[59] This is confirmed, because, according to this Doctor, [things] formally compossible or repugnant are compossible or repugnant through their formal rationes; therefore, by the same reasoning, whatever are distinguished or are the same are distinguished or are the same by their formal rationes. Therefore, if these humanities -- e.g. of Socrates and Plato -- are really distinguished, they are distinguished by their own formal rationes, and by nothing added: and consequently each of them is really distinguished from another of itself, without anything added. The {assumptum} minor premise is clear, because he says: 'It must be noted that just as repugnants are repugnant from their own rationes, so non-repugnance or compossibility is from the proper rationes of the compossibles' [I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1--4, p. 344].

[60] If it be said that from the fact that you say 'these humanities' when you say 'these humanities are distinguished really', you include the contracting differences, because they are not 'these' except through the contracting differences, and therefore they are distinguished by their formal rationes, because the differences are of the formal ratio of those humanities, so that if those differences were set aside {circumscripta}, nothing would remain except indistinct humanity:

[61] Against: whenever certain things are in any way distinguished on the part of the thing {a parte rei}, a term can be imposed to stand precisely for one and not for the other; for otherwise there could not be some true proposition denoting the distinction of one from the other. I impose, therefore, the term a to stand precisely for that which in Socrates is distinguished formally and not really from the contracting difference, because according to you there is something in Socrates that is distinguished formally from the contracting difference that is nevertheless identical really with the difference, and is therefore really singular. I impose also the term b to stand precisely for that which is distinguished formally from the contracting difference in Plato and is nevertheless identical really with that contracting difference. Then I ask: either a and b are identical really, or not. If they are, therefore, without their being changed, they are in no way distinguished really, and consequently there is something really indistinct [i.e. not distinct] in Socrates and Plato: and this they deny, because they assert that there is nothing identical really indistinct in Socrates and Plato. If they are not identical really,

therefore they are distinguished really, and therefore through their own formal rationes; but these do not include the contracting differences, {per positum} by hypothesis, and so the point is established -- that they are distinguished by themselves. Moreover, this is true, according to you: 'a is really repugnant with the contracting difference of Plato himself'; therefore it is repugnant to it through its own ratio, therefore through its own ratio it is distinguished from it really, therefore it is distinguished really by itself: and not exempt numerically, because it is not distinguished in species or in genus: therefore it is one in number by itself.

[62] If it be said that whatever [things] are repugnant or are compossible are repugnant or compossible by their own rationes or through certain [things] really identical with them:

[63] This has no force, because it is clear (according to that Doctor in the same place) that we do not speak of the repugnance and compossibility only of things that are really distinct, but also of the repugnance and compossibility of those that are only formally distinguished or are compossible, such as is clear of the divine essence and the divine relation; therefore a and b are distinguished or are identical really by themselves, even apart from those differences; and they are not the same really, because if they were, they could never be distinguished really; therefore they are distinguished really by themselves.

[64] Fourth, I argue thus: If the contracted nature were really distinct from every contracting grade, the nature would be from itself one in number, as was proved in the first question; therefore, since the nature is not less one because of the real identity with the contracting difference, it follows that it will be one in number from itself.

[65] It is confirmed, because the nature loses nothing of unity from the fact that it is really identical with what is supremely one; therefore from the fact that it is really identical with the individual difference it will not be less of itself one than if it were distinguished really from the individual difference.

[66] It is confirmed, because, according to this Doctor, whatever order certain [things] would have if they were really distinct, they have the same order where they are distinguished in some way though not really. But if the contracting difference and the nature were distinguished really, they would have the order as of two of which each was from itself one in number and one was from itself potency and the other act; therefore they will have the like order where they are distinguished formally.

[67] This confirmation is more manifest concerning the nature of the genus with respect to the specific difference, because if the nature of colour were not identical really with the specific difference of whiteness, neither would the nature of colour be identical really with the difference of blackness, and yet those natures would be distinguished by themselves, they would have an order of more perfect and less perfect; therefore where, now, they are not distinguished really from the specific differences but are distinguished from one another really, they will have the same order by themselves. This would not be possible unless they were distinguished by themselves, because it is a contradiction that certain things be related by themselves as more perfect and more imperfect unless they be distinguished by themselves, since perfect and imperfect are necessarily distinguished; therefore if, now, those specific natures have

by themselves the order of more perfect and more imperfect, they are distinguished by themselves.

[68] Fifth, it would follow that that 'grade' would be just as communicable as the nature; indeed it would in fact be communicated to many universals. This is repugnant with the nature with respect to the individual differences; therefore the individual grade is no less communicable than the nature.

[69] Sixth, because the difference and the nature are either of the same ratio or of different ratios. If of the same, therefore one is not more of itself singular than the other. If of different ratios, against: those [things] that are the one thing in creatures are not of different ratios; but the individual difference and the contracted nature are one thing; therefore etc.

[70] Similarly, the likeness and agreement is greater (or [at least] equal) between those [things] that are one thing than between those that are distinguished really; therefore [it is] more (or equally) [true that] they can agree in properties and passions -- provided, however, they are all equally simple or composite; therefore if the individual grade contracting the nature of man and the individual grade contracting the nature of ass agree in this passion, that each is of itself this, the individual grade and the nature which is really identical with that grade will equally be able to agree in the same passion.

[71] Similarly, a and b, which are the same really, are not less of the same ratio than a and d, if these are distinguished really; but the nature that is in Socrates and the nature that is in Plato, which are distinguished really, are of the same ratio; therefore, much more strongly, the nature of Socrates and the contracting difference are of the same ratio.

[72] ((Similarly, then Socrates would include something of another ratio from everything that is in Plato; this is false, because then Socrates and Plato would not be simply of the same ratio.))

[73] Seventh, if the nature were thus contracted precisely through a contracting difference distinct only formally, equally there could be asserted a real univocation, that is, of something real, on the part of the thing, univocal to God and creatures, just as it is possible to assert such univocation in respect of any individuals whatever in creatures. The consequent is against them, who assert precisely that there is some concept univocal to God and creature, and not something on the part of the thing -- as they assert, on some other part. The consequence is clear, because such a univocation should be denied only because there would follow a composition in God from something contracted and something contracting; but, asserting a formal distinction, no composition follows, because [things] that are distinguished only formally do not compose, as is clear of the divine essence and the relation; therefore such univocation is not repugnant with the divine simplicity.

[74] It is confirmed, because there is no more reason why these formally distinct [things] compose [i.e. form a composite whole] than others, even if they are more distinct than the others, because for whatever reason the grades are put in a formal distinction, for the same reason the grades would be put in a composition of [things]

formally distinct.

[75] It is confirmed, because just as when certain [things] are distinguished really, whether more or less, if they make something per se one, there is no more reason why these should compose rather than those, although these less than those, so if certain [things] are distinguished formally and make something per se one, there is no more reason why these should compose than those; therefore either all [things] formally distinct making or constituting a per se unity compose, or none do.

[AGAINST STATEMENTS OF SCOTUS]

[76] Also, running through the statements, there seem to be many things in the mode of assertion that are not well said. First, the statement that 'the nature is prior naturally to this entity as it is this'. This is not true, first because by the same reason, since there is a formal distinction between essence and relation, the essence would be naturally prior to the relation, which is false; also because, according to statements he makes elsewhere, whatever is prior by nature to another can, by divine power, come to be without the latter; but concerning the nature this is impossible, since it is really identical with the contracting difference. The minor premise is clear, because he asserts that to be prior to another is to be able to exist without it and not vice versa.

[77] Second, it does not seem well said that the individual difference is not quidditative, because whatever is of the essence of something per se in a genus is of its quiddity, and consequently is quidditative entity; but this individual difference is of the essence of an individual that is per se in a genus; therefore, etc.

[78] If it be said that it is required that it be a communicable entity, because every quiddity is communicable:

[79] This seems to be said without reason, because just as you assert that every quiddity is communicable, so just as easily I will assert that every real quiddity is communicable to [things] distinct in species, and thus the specific entity will not be quidditative entity. It seems, therefore, that it must be said that every entity that is of the essence of some thing that is per se one and existing per se in a genus is a quidditative entity, so that it makes no difference whether it be communicable or incommunicable. Indeed more truly it should be said (as will be made clear) that no real quidditative entity is communicable except as form is communicated to matter, or in such a way as a distinct thing is communicated to a distinct thing.

[80] Third, it does not seem well said that the nature is indifferent of itself and yet it really is the contracting difference, because (as it was argued) that which is of itself indifferent is indifferent; but the indifferent is not really identical with the really non-indifferent; therefore the nature and the contracting difference are not really identical.

[81] It is confirmed, because if it is of itself indifferent, it is either really of itself indifferent or not: if not, therefore it is nothing to the purpose; if it is, therefore it can really be communicated, which was disproved before. From this it follows that it does not seem well said that the nature is of itself indifferent and is yet appropriated through identity, because if it is really, in this it is repugnant to it to be in another; therefore it is

not of itself common except perhaps negatively.

[82] Fourth, it does not seem well said that the nature is really one in number although it is of itself common and is one in number only denominatively. For when certain [things] make or constitute one per se, by whatever reason a passion or property of one denominates the rest, by the same reason vice versa, just as by whatever reason a property of matter is predicated denominatively of the form, by the same reason a property or passion of the form will be predicated denominatively of the matter. Therefore, since the nature and the contracting difference make one per se, by whatever reason numerical unity is predicted denominatively of the nature, so that the nature is really one in number, by the same reason lesser unity, which is a passion of the nature itself, will be predicated denominatively of the individual difference, so that the individual difference will be really common and one by the lesser unity; and consequently the whole singular, by the same reason, will be denominated by each unity, and so the singular will be not more one in number than common, or it will be one with lesser unity. Through this it is clear that that similitude [of whiteness] is to the opposite, because just as the specific difference cannot be called one by a unity less than specific unity, so the unity of the genus cannot be called one by a unity greater than the unity of a genus.

[83] Fifth, his statement does not seem well said that 'the universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity' etc, because then it would be necessary for the universal in act to be 'one in many and of many'. Now I ask: either that universal is a being of reason, and consequently is not one in many singulars outside the soul except through predication, which is 'to be said of many'; therefore, distinguishing 'to be in many' from 'to be said of many', it is not true. And if that universal is outside the soul, therefore it is in the thing according to some unity.

[84] Sixth, it does not seem well said that community, and likewise singularity, befit the nature outside the intellect, because nothing outside the intellect is common, since outside the intellect everything whatever is really singular.

[THE AUTHOR'S ANSWER]

[85] Therefore I say otherwise to the question. And first I show the conclusion that every singular thing whatever is singular by itself. And I persuade this as follows: Because singularity immediately befits that to which it belongs, therefore it cannot befit it through something else; therefore if something is singular, it is singular by itself.

[86] Moreover, as that which is singular is related to being singular, so that which is universal is related to being universal; therefore, just as that which is singular cannot become universal or common through something added to it, so that which is common cannot through something added to it become singular; therefore whatever is singular is singular through nothing added to it, but by itself.

[87] A second conclusion, that every thing outside the soul is really singular and one in number: Because every thing outside the soul is either simple or complex; if it is simple, it does not include many things; but every thing not including many things is one in number, because every such thing and one other similar thing are, precisely, two things; therefore each of them is one in number, therefore every simple thing is

one in number. If it is composite, eventually one must come to a certain number of parts, and consequently each of those parts will be one in number, and consequently the whole [thing] composed of them will be one in number, or it will be one by aggregation.

[88] And this can also be argued under this form: I take that thing which you do not assert to be a singular thing, and I ask: either it includes many things or not. If not, I take one similar [thing] that is really distinct, and I argue thus: These things are really distinct and are not in infinite number, therefore they are in a finite number, and not other than in duality (that is manifest); therefore there are here precisely two, and consequently each of them will be one in number. But if it includes many things and not an infinity, therefore a finity, and consequently there are a number of things there, and so each of the things included will be one in number and singular. From these [propositions] it follows that each thing outside the soul is singular by itself, so that by itself without anything added it is what is immediately denominated by the concept of singularity. Nor are there any possibles whatever on the part of the thing distinct in whatever way, of which one is more indifferent than the other or of which one is more one in number than the other, unless perhaps one is more perfect than the other, as this angel is more perfect than this ass. And thus every thing outside the soul will be this by itself; nor is there to be sought any cause of individuation, except perhaps the extrinsic and intrinsic causes, when the individual is composite; but rather there would have to be sought a cause [i.e. reason explaining] how it is possible that something is common and universal.

[89] I answer, therefore, to the form of the question that that which is universal and univocal is not something really, on the part of the thing, distinct formally from the individual. For it is clear that it is not distinct only formally, because then whenever superior was predicated of inferior, the same thing would be predicated of itself, because superior and inferior would be the same thing; the consequent is false, because then the same genus would never be predicated of various species, but another and another would be predicated, which seems unsuitable.

[TO SCOTUS'S ARGUMENTS]

[90] To the first argument of the other opinion [para. 11 above] I say that 'to be in something' can be twofold: either really, or according to predication (as the predicate is said to be 'in' the subject of which it is said). In the first way it is true that whatever something is in, it is in it in every case. In the second way it is not necessary, if the subject is a common term, and therefore it does not follow that if the nature of man is of itself this, whatever the nature of man is in is this man. Nevertheless, the proposition 'the nature of man is of itself this' must be distinguished, though not perhaps by the force of the words {de virtute vocis seu sermonis}, because 'the nature of man' can supposit simply, or personally: i.e. because it can stand for the thing outside the soul, or for itself. If in the second way, thus the proposition 'the nature of stone is of itself this' is false, because then it is denoted that the concept of the mind, which is universal, is of itself this stone; and this is false, because that concept can not be this stone, either of itself or through any power whatever, though it can truly be predicated of it [standing] not for itself but for the external thing. If it be taken in the first way, thus is this true, 'The nature of man is of itself this man', and yet it is consistent with this for the nature of man to be of itself that man, indeed for the nature of man of itself to be

not this man, because since the nature of man is a common term, those statements can be true, just as two subcontraries of which each is verified of different singulars, because then they are equipollent [i.e. equivalent] to these particular [propositions]: 'Some nature of itself is this', which is verified of this nature [i.e. of this individual instance of human nature], and 'some nature of itself is not this man', which is verified of another nature [i.e. of another individual], which is not this nature. And in the same way, just as those [propositions] are consistent at the same time, '[A] man is Socrates' and '[A] man is Plato', so those stand at the same time, '[A] nature of man is of itself this man' and '[A] nature of man is of itself that man'. And when he says, 'If the nature of man is of itself this man, therefore whatever the nature of man is in is this man', I answer that it does not follow formally de virtute sermonis but is the fallacy of 'figure of diction', because one way of suppositing is changed to the other. For in the [statement], 'The nature of man is of itself this man', 'the nature of man' there supposits determinately, but in the consequent it rather supposits only confusedly. Nevertheless, whatever may be [true] about this [topic], this will be true: 'Whatever [the/a] nature of man is in is this man', because it has one true singular, namely: 'Whatever this [particular] nature of man is in is this man'. And then, to argue thus: 'Whatever [the/a] nature of man is in is this man; [the/a] nature of man is in that man; therefore that man is this man', is the fallacy of the consequent, because it argues entirely from indefinites. But in respect of the diversity of those propositions, one of which is denied and the other conceded, it must be said in the same way as of these: 'Of whatever man the ass runs, the ass of whatever man runs'.

[91] ((However it must be known that when it is said, '[The/a] nature of man is of itself this man', it should be understood as an intransitive construction, i.e. '[The/a] nature that is [the/a] man is of itself this man'.))

[92] To the second [12] I concede that what one opposite of itself befits is of itself repugnant with the other opposite. And therefore, because the nature is of itself this, as 'the nature' supposits personally, therefore I concede uniformly that numerical multitude is repugnant with the nature, i.e. [1] it is repugnant to the nature to be in another, and [2] it is repugnant to the nature to be in many. The first of these is verified of one singular, because it is repugnant to this nature to be in another; however, it is consistent with this that it is not repugnant to the nature to be in another, indeed that of itself it befits the nature to be 'in' another ((i.e. it befits the nature to be the other)); this is verified for another singular, because (as was said) these are two indefinite [statements], and, consequently, since their subject supposits personally, they are equipollent to two particulars each of which has a true singular, and consequently each is simply true. But the statement [2] 'It is repugnant to the nature to be in many' is true for any singular whatever, because to any nature it is repugnant to be in many. [*Go to paragraph 112]

[93] If it is said: It is not repugnant to the nature to be predicated of many, therefore neither is it repugnant to it to be in many.

[94] I answer that the antecedent must be distinguished, because the subject can supposit personally, and thus it is simply false because every singular is false -- namely: 'To this nature it is not repugnant etc.', and 'To that nature it is not repugnant etc.', and so of them all. Or the subject can supposit simply, and thus the antecedent is true, because then what is denoted is that the common nature, which is not in the

thing but only in a mind, can be predicated of many, [standing] not for itself but for the things. In the first way the consequence is good, because in both antecedent and consequent the subject supposits personally. In the second way it is not valid, because then in the antecedent the subject supposits simply and in the consequent personally, and thus it is the fallacy of equivocation in the third mode. If, however, the subject of the consequent could have simple supposition, the consequent would have to be negated and the consequence negated, taking 'to be in' for 'to be in something really and subjectively', because thus the nature is in no singular -- that is to say, the common is in no singular subjectively.

[95] If it be said that something the same is 'this something' and is distinguished from every other 'this something'; but the nature of itself is not distinguished from another 'this something', for then it would not be this stone; therefore stone is not of itself this stone:

[96] I answer, as before, that this is true: the nature of stone is of itself distinguished from every other 'this something' for one singular, according as the subject supposits personally. And this, similarly, is true for another singular: the nature of stone is of itself another stone than that one. And therefore it does not follow that another stone is not a stone, just as it does not follow: '[The/a] man is distinguished from Socrates, or [the/a] man is not Socrates; and [the/a] man is Socrates; therefore Socrates is not Socrates, or is distinguished from Socrates'.

[97] Also, that beginning argument [para. 1] is to the opposite, because just as [1] when one opposite befits something of itself the other opposite is repugnant to it of itself, so [2] when one opposite befits something, the other opposite is repugnant to it while the first opposite befits it; just as, if to be white befits Socrates, then while Socrates is white the other opposite cannot befit him, namely to be black. Therefore, if the nature of stone is this, the nature of stone, while it is this, cannot be in another; and thus while it is this stone there cannot be another stone that is not this stone. And so it is clear that the argument is against himself. And therefore both for him and for me it must be answered as has been said.

[98] To the third [para. 13] it must be said that some object is naturally prior to the act itself, and some is not; and therefore the universal is never prior naturally to that act, neither is the proper ratio of the object of the intellect, namely the universal in act; because, as will become clear elsewhere, the first object of the intellect by primacy of generation is the singular itself, and this under its own ratio and not under the ratio of universal.

[99] To the fourth [para. 14] I say that there is no unity of the nature existing in this stone that is not equally primo of this stone. However, I distinguish concerning unity: (1) in one way unity is said according as it denominates precisely some one thing and not many, and not one in comparison with another distinct from it really, and in that way I say that every real unity is numerical unity. (2) In another way unity is said according as it denominates many, or one in comparison with another really distinct, and in that way specific unity denotes Socrates himself and Plato, and the unity of a genus denotes this man and this ass -- not something in any way at all distinct from the individuals themselves, but it denominates immediately those individuals themselves. Thus, just as it is truly said that Socrates and Plato are one or the same in species, and

Socrates is the same in species with Plato, so it is truly said that this man and this ass are the same in genus, and that this man is the same or one in genus with this ass, that is to say that these are contained under the same species or under the same genus. The Philosopher explicitly puts forward this explanation in Topics I, chapter 'On the same' [103 a6--14], as was said in the first question on this matter. And in this way I concede that not every real unity or identity is numerical; but that unity does not befit a nature in any way whatever distinct from individuals, but befits immediately the individuals themselves, or the one in comparison with the other that is the same.

[100] But because the arguments go against the first interpretation [in para. 99], I will therefore answer them. To the first, when it is said [para. 15] according to the Philosopher that in every genus there is one first that is the metre and measure of all the other [things] of that genus, I say that, as will become clear in book II, a measure is sometimes a true thing outside the soul, as cloth is measured by the yard; sometimes the measure is only a concept in the mind. The first measure should be one by numerical unity. But the proposition is false that in every genus there is only one that is the measure of all the others; but if it has truth, it should be understood so that in every genus there is something that is the measure of all others distinct in species, but it is not necessary that there be a measure of all others whether distinct in species or not. And in this way there are many each of which is a measure of all others distinct in species, and each of them is one by numerical unity.

[101] And when it is said that the unity of the first measurer is real, I say that if the 'first' is held positively, thus this [statement] is false because of a false implication, because nothing is in that way a first measurer. But if it is held negatively, I concede it, because such firsts are many, namely any individual of that species, especially if each is equally simple.

[102] And when it is said that no singular is the measure of all the things that are in the genus, I concede that [no singular is the measure] of the individuals of the same species, but it is a measure of all things distinct in species; and this is sufficient to the purpose. ((However it must be known that the Philosopher speaks mainly, or only, of things that are of the same species, as is clear from his examples there, and of those that have individuals some of which are greater and others less, and maintains that something that is less than others is the measure of the others, but not of all the individuals of the species but only those that are not so small. [See Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1052 b31--1053 a10.]))

[103] To the second [para. 16] I say that in an undivided species comparison takes place, not because of the unity of the concept, nor precisely because of numerical unity, nor precisely because of specific unity (whether it is asserted as it was asserted in the beginning of the solutions to this argument, or is asserted according to the manner of the false imagining of some), because then in every undivided species there would be comparison. But the comparison is because of this, that many individuals of the same species can make one individual, and therefore where many [things] ((not distinct in place and subject)) can make one, there such comparison must be asserted, and not elsewhere. And because this is possible with individuals of the same species and not with individuals of different species, therefore in an undivided species comparison is found, and not in a genus. For example, this white is said to be whiter than that other white because it has parts of whiteness ((in the same subject primo)),

and if in that way many parts of whiteness and of blackness came together at the same time to make per se one coloured [thing] [this is impossible, but if it happened . . .], that could be said to be more coloured than another.

[104] And when it is said that this comparison is not made according to numerical unity, that is true in the first way of speaking of numerical unity, and therefore it is made according to specific unity, because it is made according to two of which each is one in number, and no third is required in any way distinct from those two.

[105] To the third [para. 17] I say this: supposing that likeness is a relation really distinct from its extremes [this is Scotus's opinion, not Ockham's], then it must be said that there are here two likenesses having two real foundations of which each is one in number, and therefore that one is not the real ratio of founding the likeness of the same to itself, but it is the ratio of founding the likeness of itself to the other. And it is clear that the Philosopher refers to [something] one in number, because after he said how the like, the same and the equal are said according to the one, he afterwards adds, 'And one is the beginning and the measure of number' [1021 a12--13]; therefore he does not refer to some unity of something that is not one in number. But must it be conceded that this unity is the ratio of founding this relations? It must be said that according to those who assert that those relations are really distinguished, it is not more to be asserted that unity is the proximate ratio of founding a likeness than [it is of] relations of another kind; but the difference is in this, that these relations require some real unity in the second mode spoken of at the beginning of the solution of this [fourth] argument [para. 99], such as is not required for other relations of the other kind, because for they require at least specific unity, such as is not necessarily required for others (though such unity is sometimes there).

[106] To the fourth [para. 18] I say that [the statement] that certain [things] are first extremes of a real opposition can be understood in two ways: either because they are the [things] of which 'to be opposed really' is predicated positively primo -- however it is not predicated of them [standing] for themselves, according as they have simple supposition, but for singular things, according as they have personal supposition; or because they are in the thing, really contrary. In the first way the extremes of a real opposition are not real [things], because the term 'to be opposed really' is not predicated primo and adequately of any things whatever, but only of concepts [standing] for things (if the predication is in the mind) or of words for things (if the predication is in words), and thus of other [terms]. Neither, however, should it be contended that de virtute sermonis they are contraries, but it must be said uniformly in the way it was said before of the first adequate object of the sensitive power and of the first subject of a real passion. In the second way there are not only two extremes of a real opposition, but there are many, just as there are many real oppositions. Thus this whiteness and this blackness are opposed really; similarly that whiteness and that blackness are opposed really. And it is true precisely of these that one of the contraries corrupts the other and that each of them is one in number (because nothing corrupts another unless it is one in number).

[107] And when it is said that then this white would be the first contrary of the black, I say that properly the white is not contrary to the black, but whiteness to blackness, and I concede that this whiteness is primo contrary to blackness according as the 'primo' is held negatively, because it is contrary to blackness and nothing prior to it is contrary to

blackness. But as the 'primo' is held positively, thus nothing is primo contrary to blackness.

[108] If it be said that one is contrary to one, therefore many are not contrary to blackness; similarly contraries can be in the same, [but] not so two individuals; similarly, contraries are maximally distant, but two individuals are not maximally instant:

[109] To the first I say that the Philosopher is speaking of one according to species, not according to number; and how specific unity is real and on the part of the thing has been explained, because this is nothing else than for there to be on the part of the thing many that are contained under the same species, according to the Philosopher in Topics I [103 a10--12]. To the second I concede that contraries can be in the same [thing], at least successively, and therefore I say that it is not a contradiction for the water to be hot, even in the highest degree, just as it is not a contradiction for it to be extremely cold (if there is a stand in such forms). To the third I say that contraries are maximally distant by the distance that can be between individuals of different species. But of which the maximal specific distance is required for contrariety and of which not will be explained elsewhere.

[110] To the fifth [para. 19] I say that the object of one sensation is one by numerical unity. And when it is said 'that the power knowing the object thus, namely in as much as it is one with this unity, knows it in as much as it is distinct from every other', I say that it knows that which is distinct from every other, and it knows it under the ratio by which it is distinguished from every other, because that ratio, which is the thing itself, is the immediate terminus of the act of knowing. However, it is not for this reason necessary that it should be able to discern or distinguish it from every other, because more is required for discernitive knowledge than for apprehensive knowledge, because discernitive knowledge in act is only in respect of distinct [objects], nor yet is it enough that distinct [objects] are apprehended, unless they are dissimilar in themselves or are distinguished in place and situation. And this is true when all such apprehended [objects] are apt to make something one per se, as it the case with sensible qualities, and not with certain intellections or loves of the will, not with intelligences or souls. And therefore, however much such [objects] are apprehended, it is not necessary that they be able to be discerned [i.e. distinguished from one another], because of the very great similarity among them. Nevertheless, if it is an intellective power, it can know that it is distinct from every other; yet when some certain [thing] is pointed out, it need not be able to know itself as distinct from this, because some universal can be known and yet many [of its] singulars not be known; however, a sense properly cannot know that it is distinct from anything whatever, because this belongs to the complex knowledge by which it is known that this is not this. However, the sense can discern this from some, and not from other, and sometimes it can discern this from this, and sometimes not, because of some variation on the part of the thing.

[111] And this argument is confirmed, because the sense distinguishes the more white from the less white. Then I ask : Either it apprehends one of those precisely under a common ratio, or under a ratio of singularity. If the first, and they agree in it, therefore it does not discern through it. If the second, the point is established, that it is understood under a ratio of singularity: not that this intention 'singularity' is the terminating ratio, but that that which is immediately denominated by this intention is the immediately terminating. -- And to the confirmation, I say that the first object of the

intellect by primacy of generation is one by numerical unity, and that precedes; but the first object by primacy of adequation (if, however, there is any such) is not one by numerical unity, and it does not precede, as will be said afterwards.

[112] To the sixth [para. 20], I concede that in the way in which every real unity is numerical, in that way every real diversity is numerical; because, also, specific diversity is numerical, since, according to the Philosopher, whatever things are diverse in genus are diverse in species, and whatever things are diverse in species are diverse in number. Thus numerical diversity is more extensive than {in plus ad} specific and generic diversity, because it follows, 'they are diverse in genus or species, therefore they are diverse in number', and not vice versa -- And when it is said that 'every numerical diversity in as much as it is numerical is equal', I say that this is simply false, because then it would follow that every diversity was equal, since 'in as much as' is not a destroying determination. However, if the consequent is understood to mean that all [things] which differ only numerically are equally diverse, it can be conceded in [things] which do not receive more and less [i.e. do not have degrees].

[113] And if it is said that every numerical unity is equal, therefore every numerical diversity is equal, I say that it does not follow under the interpretation in which the antecedent is true, just as it does not follow: 'All equals are equally equal, because equality does not receive more and less; therefore all unequals are equally unequal'. So it is of such [things] when one of the opposites receives more and less and not the other; and thus it is in the present case.

[114] To what is suggested in that argument, that if every diversity were numerical the intellect could no more abstract from Socrates and Plato something common than from Socrates and a line, and that every universal would be a pure figment of the intellect: I say to the first that from the fact that Socrates and Plato differ by themselves only in number, and Socrates is very similar to Plato according to substance, then, apart from anything else, the intellect can abstract something common to Socrates and Plato that will not be common to Socrates and whiteness; and there is no other reason to be sought except that Socrates is Socrates and Plato is Plato and each of them is a man.

[115] If it is said that Socrates and Plato agree more than Socrates and an ass, therefore Socrates and Plato agree in something real in which Socrates and the ass do not agree really, but not in Socrates nor in Plato, therefore in something somehow distinct, and that is common to both: I answer that, de virtute sermonis it should not be conceded that Socrates and Plato agree in something or somethings, but that they agree by somethings, because by themselves, and that Socrates agrees with Plato not 'in something' but 'by something', because by himself.

[116] If it is said that Socrates and Plato agree in man, I say that the 'man' can supposit simply or personally. In the first way it can be conceded, because this is nothing else than to say the 'man' is a common [concept] predicable of Socrates and Plato. But if the 'man' supposits personally for some thing, in this sense it is simply false, because they agree in no man, nor do they agree in some thing, but they agree by things, because by men, because by themselves. ((To the form [of the argument] I say therefore that Socrates and Plato agree by themselves more really than Socrates and the ass, but not in something real.)) [*Go to paragraph 133]

[117] To the other [still para. 20], concerning the figment, it is clear how a universal is a figment and how not.

[118] To the first confirmation of this argument [para. 20], I say that for some[things] to be primo diverse can be understood in two ways: either [1] because nothing is one and the same in both, but whatever is in one, simply and absolutely of itself it is not something that is in the other, and in this way I concede that all individuals are of themselves primo diverse (unless perhaps it is otherwise of individuals one of which is generated from the other, on account of the numerical identity of the matter in both). And otherwise [2] some [things] are said to be primo diverse when one is immediately and primo denied of the other. And therefore when one is not immediately denied of the other, so that a negative made up of them is not immediate, then they are different and not only diverse. In that way all individuals of the same species are primo diverse, because an immediate negative proposition is made up of them. Similarly, all species contained immediately under some genus are primo diverse, because an immediate proposition is made up of them. And therefore Socrates and Plato are primo diverse in that way, but Socrates and this ass are not primo diverse: because this is immediate, 'Socrates is not Plato', but this is not immediate, 'Socrates is not this ass', because this is more immediate, 'No man is this ass'. Therefore it is not well said, as it commonly is said, that the primo diverse are those [things] that agree in nothing, and the different are those that agree in something. But the primo diverse are those of which neither differs from the other through something more common of which the other is first denied, and the different are those of which one is denied of the other because something more common than it is first denied of the same. ((That is, the primo diverse are those when nothing more common than either of them is the medium of concluding a negative of one of the other; the different are those when something more common than either is the medium of concluding a negative in which one is denied of the other, as this man and this ass differ, because 'man' is such a medium, and similarly 'ass'. For this syllogism is good: 'No man is an ass, this man is a man, therefore this man is not this ass'.))

[119] And that this is the Philosopher's meaning is clear from what he says in *Metaphysics*, X [1054 b23--30]: 'Difference and diversity are not the same. For the diverse and what it is diverse from need not be diverse by something'; that is, it is not necessary that there be something [X] more common than that which is diverse [A], which that from which it is diverse [B] is previously and immediately denied of, just as to this, that [A] Socrates be diverse from [B] Plato, it is not necessary that there be something [X] more common than Socrates of which Plato is denied immediately, and Socrates only mediately -- rather, 'Socrates is not Plato' is immediate. And the Philosopher gives a reason: 'And every way being is either diverse or the same', that is, every being, whether it has something more common of which another is previously negated or not, this being is the same as or diverse from any other being that may be pointed to. 'But that which is different from something differs by something', that is, every [thing] differing from another differs through something previous and more common, of which the other is negated immediately and negated of it only mediately: as this man differs from the ass through man, of which ass is negated immediately and of this man only mediately. ((It must be known that when I say that this man differs from the ass through man, I take 'differ through something' as I explain in distinction 8, when I explain how something differs from another through an essential difference. And therefore 'differ through something' is taken equivocally in different places.)) And this

is what he adds: 'Therefore it is necessary that there be something the same, by which they differ.' This should not be understood to mean that there is something the same by which each differs from the other, because this is impossible, because then they would agree by that, rather than differ. But it should be understood [to mean] that there is something the by same through which, as through a medium, it is shown that this differing thing differs from that, as through substance as through a medium it is shown that a man is not a quantity, speaking thus: 'No substance is a quantity, a man is a substance, therefore no man is a quantity'. And so that medium is more common than the differing [thing] is, because it is always its genus or species. And this is what the Philosopher says: 'And this same itself', supply, by which the different differs from the other, 'is genus or species' -- supply, it is a genus or species to that differing [thing] and is not its difference, 'for everything that differs differs by genus or species'. And thus {nihil est dictu} it is not to be said that [things] that differ differ by their differences and agree by genus, if they are in a genus, but it should be said that they differ by their genera, or by the species, or by their species, not on the part of the thing but in the negation of one of the other, mediate or immediate. And the Philosopher puts examples, saying, 'By genus' -- supply, there are some [things] which differ, 'which do not have a common matter, nor are generated out of one another, so that each belongs to a different category'. Note that [things] in distinct predicaments differ by genus, and consequently differ by species. 'And by species, which have the same genus', and yet the species are diverse. Thus I say that man and whiteness differ by their genera, because each has a superior genus through which a negation of one of the other can be made, according to the technique the Philosopher teaches in Posterior Analytics, book I [Ch. 15, 79 a34--79 b23]. And whiteness and substance differ by genus, because although whiteness has a genus through which a negative can be shown in which whiteness is negated of substance or vice versa, yet substance does not have such a genus; but these common [concepts], substance and quality, do not differ either by genus or by species. And it must be said in the same way, proportionably, of things differing by species. And so, when the Philosopher says that all differing [things] -- according as different things are distinguished from diverse things -- differ by genus or by species, and Socrates and Plato differ neither by genus nor by species, it is manifest that they do not differ; but Socrates and this ass differ, because they differ by species.

[120] If it is said that this is against the Philosopher's meaning, because in the same place he immediately adds: 'What is called the genus is the identical thing that the differing things are said to be according to their substance' [1054 b30--31]; therefore it seems that, according to him, [things] contained immediately under a genus are differing [things].

[121] Similarly, the Commentator in the same place, comment 12: '[Things] that differ through formal differences are those of which the genus is one'.

[122] Also, in Metaphysics, book 5 [1018 a12--15]: "'Different" is applied to whatever diverse [things] are beings something the same, only not in number, but in species, or in genus, or by proportion. Further, to those whose genus is diverse, and to contraries, and to whatever [things] have diversity in substance'.

[123] To the first of these [para. 120] I say that that is the genus which, being the same, is predicated of certain [things] differing according to substance, because every genus

is predicted of many [things] differing by species; however, not all those differ of which it is predicated, because an immediate proposition is composed of some of which it [the genus] is predicated, and not composed of others.

[124] To the second [para. 121] I say that some [things] that differ through formal differences have the same genus, and universally all things outside the soul that differ really through formal differences have the same genus, because such are only the individuals of different species; however it is not necessary that all [things] that have the same genus differ through formal differences, as will be made clear elsewhere.

[125] To the third [para. 122] I say that the Philosopher takes 'different' here as it precisely befits things, and then all things whatever are diverse and are 'beings something the same', not through identity but through essential predication -- i.e. something that is the same truly and essential is predicated of them; 'and not only in number', i.e. those things are not diverse only according to number, as are the individuals of the one species, but (supply, are diverse) 'either by species, or by genus, or by proportion'. Such diverse [things], I say, are different. However, not all diverse [things] are different, because a real being and a being of reason are diverse, but not different, because nothing the same is predicated of them quidditatively ((according to the opinion that asserts that a being of reason has only objective being {esse obiectivum}; according to another opinion something is predicated quidditatively of them)). Afterwards the Philosopher posits other modes of differing [things].

[126] If it is said that those [things] that differ agree more than those that are only diverse, therefore this man would agree more with this ass than this man with that man:

[127] I say that taking 'different' as the Philosopher takes it in Metaphysics, book 10 [1054 b25--8], in that sense is not always true that different [things] agree more than diverse [things] in the strict sense, but it is enough that they differ by more [things], i.e. that of more [things] that are predicated truly of one of them the other is truly negated, as this stone, in comparison with this [other] man, is truly negated of more of the [things] that are predicated of that man, and therefore that man and this stone differ, and not so this man and that man.

[128] To the other confirmation [para. 20] [I answer] through the same [argument].

[129] To the other [para. 21] I say that if no intellect existed there would be some real unity between the generating fire and the generated fire, because of which the generation would be called univocal. But the unity would not be said of some one [thing], but it would be said of many [things] really distinct, as has been said. Therefore etc.

[130] To the text from Avicenna [para. 22] I say that 'horseness is just horseness' should not be understood in such a way that horseness is neither one nor many, neither in the intellect nor in effect, because really horseness is in effect and is really singular. For just as horseness is really created by God, and similarly horseness is really distinct from God, so horseness is really and truly singular. But Avicenna means that those [things] do not befit horseness per se in the first way, not is any of them put in its definition, as he expresses it.

[131] If it is said, according to Avicenna and according to other philosophers, that horseness is of itself indifferent to being singular and to being universal, I ask [i.e. an objector asks] how is this true? According as horseness supposits either simply, or personally: if simply, and this concept is not indifferent, because in no way can it be a singular, therefore the supposition is not simple when the term supposits for the concept, which is against the foregoing; if it supposits personally, then it is false, because then it supposits for singulars, but nothing singular is thus indifferent. Therefore it seems that besides supposition for a concept and for a singular thing it is necessary to assert a third, when the term supposits for the quiddity itself absolutely indifferent to both [and such a supposition is not to be asserted];

[132] I answer -- uniformly with some of the [things] said earlier -- that it is not true that 'horseness is not of itself universal, nor particular, but indifferent to being universal and to being singular', except as it means one signate act which is this: 'To be "universal" and to be "singular" can be predicated indifferently of horseness'. And in this signate act 'horseness' has simple supposition; but in the two corresponding true exercised acts, 'horseness' will have diverse supposition, because in one it will have simple supposition, namely in 'Horseness is universal', and in the other personal, namely in 'Horseness is singular'. For example, this is true: "'Sound", and "run" are predicated of man', and in this the 'man' has material supposition, because both are predicated of this sound 'man'. And to this signate act will correspond two true exercised acts, namely 'Man is a sound', in which 'man' supposits materially, and '[A] man runs', in which 'man' supposits personally.

[133] To the last [para. 23] I say that when agreeing and differing [things] are mutually compatible, it is not unsuitable that they befit the same through the same; and therefore it is not unsuitable that some [things] agree specifically and yet differ numerically. This is clear through his own example, because it is certain that the contracted nature agrees really with the individual difference, because it is really the same thing, and yet the nature is somehow distinguished from the contracting difference. Then I ask: either it agrees and differs by the same, or by one [thing] and another. If by the same, I establish the point, that the same by the same [thing], undistinguished really, agrees with the same and is distinguished formally. And just as easily I will say that Socrates by the same [thing] agrees in species with Plato and is distinguished numerically; and thus universally of all such. And if they agree and are distinguished by one [thing] and another, I ask concerning these. Because they are in some way distinguished, and yet agree, because they are one thing: either, therefore, they agree and are distinguished by the same, or by one [thing] and another. And thus either there will be a process to infinity, it will stand that the same [thing] by the one [thing] thus agrees with a certain [thing] and is distinguished thus from the same. And I will just as easily say that the same by the same agrees in species with a certain [thing] and is distinguished numerically from the same.

[134] If it is said: setting aside every intellect, there is a greater agreement, from the nature of the thing, between Socrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass, therefore, from the nature of the thing, Socrates and Plato agree in some nature in which Socrates and this ass do not agree;

[135] Similarly, unless there is a greater agreement between Socrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass, a specific concept could not more be abstracted from

Socrates and Plato than from Socrates and this ass:

[136] To the first of these [para. 134] I say that the consequence made is not valid, just as it does not follow, 'An intellectual nature really agrees more with God, from the fact that it is God's image, than an insensible nature, which is not an image'; and yet they agree in no real [thing] that is in some way distinct from them, even according to them [i.e. Scotus]; but certainly by themselves they agree more. So it is in the present case, that Socrates and Plato by themselves agree more than Socrates and this ass, setting aside everything else. Similarly, real being agrees more with God than a being of reason, and yet God does not agree with a creature in something, except perhaps in a concept.

[137] Through this it is clear to the second [para. 135], that there is a greater agreement between Socrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass, not because of something in some way distinct; but they agree more by themselves.

[138] This answer is confirmed by their [Scotus's] statements. Because I take two individual differences contracting the nature of man: these differences agree more than an individual difference contracting the nature of man and an individual difference contracting the nature of whiteness. The proof of this: For an individual difference contracting the nature of man agrees with the nature contracted, because it is really the same thing with it; but the nature contracted, e.g. the nature of Socrates, agrees more with the nature of Plato than with the nature of whiteness, therefore it agrees more with the contracting individual difference. And consequently, from first to last, the individual difference of Socrates agrees more with the individual difference of Plato than with the individual difference of this whiteness, and it is certain that it is distinguished really from it. Therefore it agrees more with the one than with the other either by the same, or by another. If by the same, and by the same it agrees with one and is distinguished from the other, then the point is established, that something can by the same agree with something and be distinguished from the same. If by one [thing] and another, therefore the individual difference would include many [things], and there would be a process to infinity, each of which is unsuitable.

[139] If it is said that this individual difference, e.g. of Socrates, agrees more with Plato's nature and with Plato's individual difference than with the nature of this whiteness, not through itself or from itself, but through the contracted nature:

[140] Against: Just as the individual difference of Socrates agrees more with Plato's nature, so vice versa Plato's nature agrees more with the individual difference of Socrates than with the individual difference of this whiteness; therefore it agrees more either from itself, or through the contracting individual difference, or through the nature of Socrates. If the first, and it is certain that it is distinguished of itself, therefore the same by the same is distinguished from and agrees with the same. The second cannot be given, because then that individual difference would agree more with one individual difference than with the other. Neither can the third be given, because something never is the same really with something through something extrinsic to itself and really distinct from it.

[141] If it is said that although it agrees of itself with this individual difference, nevertheless it is not distinguished from it except through another individual difference:

[142] Against: the nature is distinguished of itself from every individual difference, because according to them [Scotus] it is not repugnant to it of itself to be without any individual difference. Further, two individual differences, from the fact that each is a creature, agree more than this creature and God, and it is certain that they are distinguished; therefore either it is necessary to assert that the same by the same is distinguished and agrees, or it is necessary to assert a process to infinity.

[TO THE BEGINNING ARGUMENT]

[143]. To the beginning argument, it is clear that the nature of [the/a] stone is of itself this, and therefore the nature of [the/a] stone cannot be in another; and yet it is consistent with this that the nature of [the/a] stone of itself is not this, but that, and in another, because these are two indefinite [statements], verified for diverse singulars. ((However, it must be known that de virtute sermonis this is false: 'The nature of the stone is in the stone', but it should be conceded that the nature of the stone is the stone (however, concerning Christ it can be conceded that human nature is 'in' Christ). Commonly, however, it is conceded. But if it is understood [to mean] that the nature of the stone is truly in the stone as in something in some way distinct, it is simply false. But if it is understood [to mean] that that [the] nature is [the] stone, it is true.))